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ABSTRACT: In its judgment in the Swiss MoU case, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ) annuls a European Commission decision on the signing of an addendum to a Memoran-
dum of Understanding with Switzerland on the subject of Switzerland’s financial contributions to 
ensure that country’s continued access to the internal market after Croatia’s accession in 2011. In 
doing so, the ECJ makes a meaningful contribution to clarifying the law on the issue of the division 
of powers between the EU institutions with regards to the conclusion of non-binding agreements 
by the European Union – an issue on which the EU Treaties are silent. Unfortunately, the picture to 
which Swiss MoU adds a few brush strokes is one in which the power to conclude non-binding 
agreements is divided only between the Commission and the Council. The European Parliament, 
by contrast, remains invisible. This Insight argues that a more comprehensive reading of the EU 
Treaty is called for; one which takes into account not only the policy-making powers of the Council 
and the power of external representation of the Commission, but also the power of the European 
Parliament to exercise political control and legislative functions. Only such a reading would do jus-
tice to the dual source of democratic legitimacy of the EU: the individual EU citizens as represented 
in the Parliament, and the EU citizens as represented by their governments in the Council.  
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I. Introduction 
On 28 July 2016, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rendered 
judgment in the Swiss Memorandum of Understanding (“Swiss MoU”) case.1 The case 
offered the Court an opportunity to further clarify the division of powers between the 
political institutions of the EU in the area of external action. In particular, the Court pro-
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vided some clarification on the procedural legal basis on which the EU can conclude so-
called ‘non-binding’ or ‘political’ agreements with third countries – an issue for which the 
Lisbon Treaty did not make express provision.2  
The immediate cause of the dispute in Swiss MoU was the adoption, on 3 Septem-
ber 2013, by the Commission, of a decision authorising the Commission Vice-President 
and the Commissioner for Regional Policy to sign an MoU with Switzerland (the “2013 
MoU”).3 The MoU served to establish a legal framework within which Switzerland would 
be able to conclude bilateral agreements with Croatia. These bilateral agreements 
would allow Switzerland to finance projects within Croatia, as part of Switzerland’s fi-
nancial contributions to ensure continued access to the EU internal market after the ac-
cession of Croatia to the EU in 2011.  
The 2013 MoU was not the first of its kind. Similar MoU’s had been concluded on 
the occasion of earlier accession rounds. The 2013 MoU, however, was the first MoU to 
be adopted with Switzerland after the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, in 2009.4 
In contrast to the earlier MoU’s, the 2013 MoU was concluded and signed by the Com-
mission independently, without Council participation.5 The Commission felt confident to 
proceed this way, as in 2012 the Council and the representatives of the Member States 
had adopted conclusions in which they had invited the Commission, in close coopera-
tion with the Presidency of the Council, to “engage in the necessary discussions” with 
Switzerland to come to an agreement on that country’s financial contribution to com-
pensate for the enlargement of the EU internal market after Croatia’s accession. The 
 
2 The Treaty of Lisbon notoriously introduced a provision (Art. 218 TFEU) setting out a detailed pro-
cedure for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements. This provision has itself been the 
object of litigation before the ECJ. See e.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 14 June 2016, case C-263/14, Par-
liament v. Council (“Somali Pirates II” ), discussed in T. VERELLEN, Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: the Sequel, or 
how the CJEU further embeds the CFSP into the EU legal order, in European Law Blog, 23 August 2016, 
www.europeanlawblog.eu, or Court of Justice, judgment of 28 April 2015, case C-28/12, Commission v. 
Council (“US Air Transport Agreement”), discussed in T. VERELLEN, On Hybrid Decisions, Mixed Agreements 
and the Limits of the New Legal Order: Commission v. Council (“US Air Transport Agreement”), in Com-
mon Market Law Review, 2016, p. 741 et seq. 
3 Commission Decision C(2013) 6355 final of 3 October 2013 on the signature of the Addendum to 
the Memorandum of Understanding on a Swiss financial contribution. 
4 Note that under the EEC Treaty, in the 1994 case of France v. Commission, the ECJ had accepted a 
plea by France that the Commission lacked the power to conclude an agreement with the United States 
anti-trust authorities which aimed to promote cooperation and coordination and lessen the possibility or 
impact of differences between the EU and the US in the application of their anti-trust/competition laws. 
Considering the significant constitutional changes brought about by the coming into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009, the precedential value of this judgment is limited. See Court of Justice, judgment of 9 Au-
gust 1994, case C-327/91, France v. Commission. 
5 The tendency of the Commission to act independently on the international stage is broader than 
the case discussed here. See P. GARCIA ANDRADE, The Distribution of Powers between EU Institutions for 
Conducting External Affairs through Non-Binding Instruments, in European Papers, 2016, 
www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 122.  
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Council conclusions required the Commission to consult the relevant Council working 
group as to the progress of the discussions. 
As mentioned, the Lisbon Treaty does not provide for the conclusion of non-binding 
agreements with third countries. This raised the question of the appropriate procedural 
legal basis upon which such decisions authorising the signing of such agreements ought 
to be adopted. The Commission considered itself empowered to adopt the decision at 
issue on the basis of its powers to ensure the EU’s “external representation”, and its 
power to fulfil “executive” as well as “management” functions. All of these powers are 
given textual expression in Art. 17, para. 1, of the TEU. The Council, by contrast, under-
stood the decision to conclude the MoU as an exercise of its power to carry out “policy-
making functions”, as provided for in Art. 16, para. 1, TEU.  
In short, the constitutional questions at issue in Swiss MoU are the following: how is 
one to read the scope of the Commission’s and Council’s powers with regard to the 
conclusion of non-binding agreements with third countries? Where does “external rep-
resentation” end and “policy-making” start in this increasingly important area of EU ex-
ternal action?  
II. Advocate General Sharpston’s opinion 
In a relatively elaborate opinion, AG Sharpston recommended the Court to annul the 
contested decision, while maintaining its effects until the adoption of a new decision.6  
Her opinion consisted essentially of four parts. In a first part, the AG examined the 
admissibility of the annulment action ex proprio motu.7 She wondered, in particular, 
whether a non-binding MoU as the one at issue should be considered an act of the in-
stitutions that “intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties” in the meaning 
of Art. 263 TFEU. The question of what should be understood by the term “legal effects” 
is not self-evident, as the discussion in the IOV case on the question of whether rec-
ommendations issued by the International Organisation for Wine and Vine should be 
considered as “having legal effect” in the meaning of Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU has illus-
trated.8 Drawing, in part, on the discussion in IOV, the AG argued in favour of admissi-
bility, considering that the effect of the contested Commission decision on the powers 
of the Council can be understood as a “legal effect” vis-à-vis a “third party” in the mean-
ing of Art. 263 TFEU.  
 
6 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 26 November 2015, case C-660/13, Council v. Commission 
(“Swiss MoU”). For a more elaborate discussion, see P. GARCIA ANDRADE, The Distribution of Powers, cit., p. 
115 et seq. 
7 Ibid., paras 57-72. 
8 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 October 2014, case C-399/12, Germany v. Council (“IOV”), in particu-
lar paras 56-64. 
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In a second part, the AG touched on the issue of the division of powers between the 
EU and the Member States.9 Neither the Commission nor the Council, nor, for that mat-
ter, any of the intervening Member States, had raised this issue. The AG nonetheless 
felt compelled to address it, as the question of the division of powers between the insti-
tutions only arises in the presence of a substantive EU competence. Put differently, if 
the EU, taken as a whole, lacks power, a fortiori the individual institutions are not em-
powered to act. However, as the Council had not formally made a plea based on a lack 
of substantive competence for the EU to act, the AG considered the Council’s arguments 
on that issue to be inoperative.  
The third part of the AG’s opinion addressed the core charge of the Council, i.e. its 
argument that, in adopting the decision, the Commission had encroached on the Coun-
cil’s power to carry out “policy-making functions”.10 The AG answered this question in 
the positive. She considered that  
“policy-making includes the decision that an objective for which the Union is competent 
can be pursued by obtaining a commitment (whether or not binding) from a third State 
to pay a financial contribution to a new Member State pursuant to a future bilateral 
agreement between those two parties (assuming no such decision has been taken earli-
er) and thus by participating in external action, in the form of negotiations and possibly 
the subsequent conclusion of an instrument to obtain that commitment.  
When the Council has exercised that prerogative by authorising negotiations, it is then 
for the Commission to represent the Union in negotiations, in accordance with the 
Council’s authorisation and the Union’s policies and interests. However, that initial Coun-
cil decision does not extinguish the Council’s power under Art. 16(1) TEU to decide on 
whether or not the Union should become a party to the instrument resulting from those 
negotiations and sign it.  
It is for the Council to verify the content of the agreement, the form of external action 
used, whether any relevant constraints have been respected and the continuing need for 
the Union to become a party to that agreement”.11 
On this basis, the AG considered that, by authorising the signing of the MoU to take 
place, without obtaining prior Council approval, the Commission had encroached upon 
the Council’s policy-making authority. In doing so, the Commission had denied the 
Council the opportunity to assess whether the end result of the negotiations fitted with-
in the Council’s broader policy on the topic of Switzerland’s financial contributions to 
ensure internal market access. 
In a fourth part, the AG addressed the Council’s plea on the basis of the principle of 
sincere cooperation.12 The Council had essentially argued that, by refusing to obtain 
 
9 Opinion of AG Sharpston, “Swiss MoU”, cit., paras 82-88. 
10 Ibid., paras 89-117. 
11 Ibid., paras 111-113. 
12 Ibid., paras 118-142. 
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Council approval to the adoption of the contested decision, the Commission had violated 
the principle of sincere cooperation provided for in Art. 13, para. 2, TEU. Briefly put, while 
emphasising the importance of information sharing, the AG nonetheless considered the 
content of the Council’s plea on the basis of Art. 13, para. 2, TEU to correspond with the 
content of its earlier plea, alleging an encroachment on its policy-making powers.13 
As the AG considered the Council’s plea alleging a violation of Art. 16, para. 1, TEU 
well-founded, she proposed the Court to annul the contested decision. In order to avoid 
negative repercussions on the EU’s relations with Switzerland, she advised the Court to 
maintain the contested decision’s effects until the adoption of a new decision.14 
III. The Grand Chamber’s judgment 
The Grand Chamber proceeded to annul the contested decision, while maintaining its 
effects until the coming into force of a new decision, which ought to be adopted “within 
a reasonable time.” 
Despite the AG’s elaborate treatment of the question, the ECJ did not dwell on the 
question of the action’s admissibility. Instead, it immediately turned to the substance of 
the case, i.e. the Council’s pleas alleging an encroachment upon its powers to make pol-
icy and a violation of the principle of sincere cooperation. In response to the first plea, 
the Court held that  
“[t]he decision concerning the signing of an agreement with a third country covering an 
area for which the Union is competent — irrespective of whether or not that agreement 
is binding — requires an assessment to be made, in compliance with strategic guidelines 
laid down by the European Council and the principles and objectives of the Union’s ex-
ternal action laid down in Art. 21(1) and (2) TEU, of the Union’s interests in the context of 
its relations with the third country concerned, and the divergent interests arising in 
those relations to be reconciled”.15 
This need to make an “assessment of interests”, the Court held, implies that the is-
sue at hand could not be understood merely as a matter of external representation. Ra-
ther, the decision had to be understood as “one of the measures by which the Union’s 
policy is made and its external action planned for the purpose of the second sentence 
of Art. 16(1) and the third subparagraph of Art. 16(6) TEU”.16 
To the Commission’s argument that it had acted only within the boundaries set out 
by the Council in its 2012 conclusions, the Court responded that “the signature of a non-
binding agreement entails the assessment by the Union of whether the agreement still 
 
13 Ibid., para. 136. 
14 Ibid., paras 143-147.  
15 “Swiss MoU”, cit., para. 39. 
16 Ibid., para. 40. 
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reflects its interest, as defined by the Council in particular in the decision to open nego-
tiations on the conclusion of the agreement”.17 In other words, the Council’s policy-
making powers do not expire after the authorisation to negotiate an agreement; also at 
the phase of the conclusion, including the agreement’s signing, are policy-assessments 
involved – decisions which only the Council is to make.  
As the Court decided to annul the Commission’s decision for reasons related to the 
division of powers between the EU institutions, it was not necessary to answer the 
Council’s second plea on the principle of sincere cooperation.  
IV. Assessment: accountability, not only towards the Member States, 
but also towards the citizens of Europe 
Non-binding agreements are concluded often to infuse flexibility in a polity’s foreign re-
lations. Such flexibility is achieved, in many instances, by by-passing the legislature and 
thus by strengthening the executive.18 In many polities, the constitutionality of such 
practices is not contested.19 The lack of binding character of such agreements, it is typi-
cally held, ensures that they do not disturb the balance of power between the different 
branches of government.  
The political importance of such non-binding agreements in contemporary interna-
tional relations is, however, well-established.20 As authors such as Jan Klabbers have ar-
gued, moreover, such instruments of “soft law” tend to have rather “hard” legal effects 
once concluded, as courts more and more often rely on sources of non-binding, “soft” 
law in their reasoning.21 It is thus to be commended, and not entirely unsurprising in 
light of the ECJ’s long-standing tradition of purposive reasoning, that the ECJ did not de-
ny the parties in Swiss MoU access to the court room merely because the agreement 
lacks “binding” force in the traditional, formalist understanding of the term.22 However, 
 
17 Ibid., para. 42. 
18 See e.g. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1986), Section 301, 
Reporters’ note 2: “A nonbinding agreement is sometimes used in order to avoid processes required by a 
national constitutional system for making legally-binding agreements”. 
19 In the United Kingdom, for example, MoUs are routinely concluded. On the practice, see HM 
GOVERNMENT (TREATY SECTION, LEGAL DIRECTORATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE) (UK), Treaties and Mem-
oranda of Understanding (MOUs). Guidance on Practice and Procedures, Second Edition April 2000, up-
dated March 2014, www.gov.uk/government. 
20 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1986), Section 301, Report-
ers’ note 2: “[T]he political inducements to comply with such agreements may be strong and the conse-
quences of noncompliance may sometimes be serious”. 
21 On this topic, see generally J. KLABBERS, The Concept of Treaty in International Law, The 
Hague/London/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996. 
22 The use of effet utile-style purposive reasoning and the rejection of formalist categories by the ECJ 
is well recorded. For a recent discussion, see generally G. BECK, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice 
of the EU, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013. 
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that the ECJ did not feel compelled to address the question of the admissibility of the 
action directly is, also in light of the AG’s elaborate treatment of the question, regretta-
ble, as it confirms the ECJ’s reputation as a court that evades legal accountability.23  
On the substantive question of the division of labour between Council and Com-
mission in the process of concluding non-binding agreements, the ECJ does not provide 
much justification for its decision to annul the Commission’s decision. In particular, a 
theory of how the Council’s policy-making power relates to the Commission’s power of 
external representation is still lacking. The only indication given by the Court is the ref-
erence to the reconciliation of “interests”. As the decision to authorise the signing of the 
2013 MoU involved some form of interest assessment, the Council was empowered to 
adopt the decision, not the Commission. 
Merely on the basis of this line of reasoning, it is not immediately clear what scope 
for independent action remains for the Commission. To acquire a fuller understanding 
of how the Court understands the relationship between the Council’s power to make 
policy and the Commission’s power to represent the EU externally, it is therefore inter-
esting to zoom out slightly, and read the Court’s ruling in Swiss MoU alongside its judg-
ment in the case of Australian Greenhouse Gas Emissions.24 In the latter case, the ECJ 
partially annulled negotiating directives adopted by the Council in the context of a trea-
ty-making procedure. In the contested directives, the Council had empowered a com-
mittee to issue “detailed negotiating positions”, which the Commission was to defend in 
the treaty-negotiation process. The ECJ considered this part of the directives too de-
tailed for the purpose of Arts 218, para. 4, TFEU and 17, para. 1, TEU and proceeded to 
partial annulment.25 
The broader picture emerging from a joint reading of Swiss MoU and Australian 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions is one in which the ECJ recognises the remarkably broad 
scope of the Council’s policy-making functions in treaty-making processes, be they of a 
formal or an informal nature. As soon as some form of “interest calculation” is present – 
and when is it not?26 – authority devolves to the Council. This implies that both the 
opening and the closing of treaty negotiations require a Council decision. During the 
treaty-negotiation process, however, the Commission enjoys a meaningful space for in-
 
23 The legitimacy of courts depends, to an important extent, on the quality and transparency of their 
legal reasoning, reason for which Art. 36 of the Statute of the ECJ requires that “judgments shall state the 
reasons on which they are based”. For a critical appraisal of the ECJ’s style of reasoning and a call for more 
transparency, inter alia by allowing the use of concurring and dissenting opinions, see V. PERJU, Reason and 
Authority in the European Court of Justice, in Virginia Journal of International Law, 2009, p. 307 et seq. 
24 Court of Justice, judgment of 16 July 2015, case C-425/13, Commission v. Council (“Australian 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions”). 
25 Ibid., paras 85-93. 
26 For an example of a hypothesis in which the ECJ considers a matter to be entirely devoid of a policy-
making dimension, see Court of Justice, judgment of 6 October 2015, case C-73/14, Council v. Commission 
(“ITLOS”), discussed by the present author in SEW, Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht, 2016.  
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dependent action, allowing it to anticipate and respond to positions and strategies em-
ployed by the other parties around the negotiating table. The Council is allowed to play 
a supervisory role by installing a special committee to which the Commission must oc-
casionally report,27 but this supervisory role cannot go as far as to entail the issuing of 
binding detailed negotiating positions.  
This arrangement is to be commended for the balance it strikes between protecting 
the Commission’s flexibility at the negotiating table on the one hand, and ensuring that 
the Commission remain accountable to the legislative branch – here the Council – on 
the other.28 The EU arrangement on this issue compares positively to arrangements in 
place in other federal-type polities, where, as mentioned, the executive typically is much 
less constrained by the legislature. 
This observation, however, immediately points to the weakness of the picture that 
emerges from a joint reading of Swiss MoU and Australian Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 
ensuring political accountability also in the increasingly important area of “non-binding” 
political agreements requires not only accountability vis-à-vis the Member States, but 
also vis-à-vis the EU citizenry, as represented in the European Parliament.29 A more 
comprehensive and ultimately more persuasive reading of the post-Lisbon constitu-
tional framework on the issue of the conclusion of non-binding international agree-
ments is one that takes into account not only Arts 16 and 17 TEU, on the powers of the 
Council and Commission, but also Art. 14 TEU, in particular the Parliament’s power to 
exercise “political control” and “legislative functions”.30 
 
27 Art. 218, para. 4, TFEU expressly provides for the establishment of a “special committee in consul-
tation with which the negotiations must be conducted.”  
28 For an analysis of EU law-making processes through a “separation fo powers” lens, see e.g. K. 
LENAERTS, Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community, in Common Market 
Law Review, 1991, p. 11 et seq. 
29 This point flows from the text of Treaties, which in Art. 14, para. 1, TEU empowers the Parliament 
to exercise “political control” and from Art. 10, para. 1, TEU, which provides that “[t]he functioning of the 
Union shall be founded on representative democracy”. Furthermore, in structural terms, the fact that EU 
law affects the legal status of individuals directly calls for a democratisation of the process through which 
EU law is created. The centrality of the individual in the European integration project can be traced back 
to Van Gend & Loos, where the ECJ held that “the Community constitutes a new legal order of interna-
tional law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited 
fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals” (Court of Jus-
tice, judgment of 5 February 1963, case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, p. 12. Emphasis added). In support of a 
bicameral understanding of the EU legislature, see also I. PERNICE, Multilevel Constitutionalism and the 
Crisis of Democracy in Europe, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2015, pp. 545 et seq. 
30 In that regard, it should be emphasised that in the present-day state of international law, the dis-
tinction between international agreements and domestic legislation is blurring, as treaties increasingly 
often include generally applicable rules and principles which potentially affect the legal status of individu-
als. In this sense, see already W. FRIEDMAN, The Changing Structure of International Law, New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1964, describing this development as one of a supplementing of a well-
established international law of “co-existence” with an international law of “co-operation”, in which not 
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What form of parliamentary involvement does Art. 14 TEU call for? The Lisbon trea-
ty framers envisaged a parallelism between the Parliament’s domestic legislative pow-
ers and its external powers in the area of treaty-making. Art. 218, para. 6, TFEU gives 
expression to this objective, in particular where it requires parliamentary consent for 
the conclusion of international agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary 
legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure where consent by the 
European Parliament is required. Requirements of coherence as well as a more struc-
tural concern about ensuring that in the sphere of non-binding agreements as well, the 
two sources of democratic legitimacy of EU law-making have their part to play, call for a 
parliamentary consent-requirement on the basis of Art. 14 TEU that runs parallel with 
Art. 218, para. 6, TFEU. This implies that parliamentary consent is to be obtained when-
ever the Council wishes to conclude a non-binding agreement that involves a degree of 
policy-making in a field in which parliamentary consent is required for the adoption of 
domestic legislation.31  
In Swiss MoU, The ECJ clarifies some aspects of the constitutional framework on the 
conclusion of non-binding agreements by the EU (i.e. the division of labour between the 
Commission and the Council), but leaves others untouched (i.e. the role of the Parlia-
ment). It is to be regretted that the ECJ did not sketch out a more comprehensive picture. 
Perhaps the Court will have the opportunity to do so in a future case – preferably one in 
which not only the Commission and the Council participate, but the Parliament as well.  
 
only states, but also private corporations and private individuals are recognised as holders of rights and 
obligations.  
31 A contrario, in the absence of a policy-making dimension, neither Council nor Parliament are to be 
involved in the adoption of the agreement. When this will be the case arguably is an assessment that will 
have to be made on a case-by-case basis. 
